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IDA PETRETTA*
The Question of  Comparison†
Comparison is a key component of legal reasoning. We move  merrily 
from like to like within the doctrine of precedent. We invoke com-
parison whenever we distinguish or apply a case. This Article begins 
by elucidating how comparison is present in law. The Article shows 
how law cannot function without comparison, and how the legal world 
skips over the central role comparison plays in these matters. The 
Article explores the literature on legal comparison and draws on in-
sights from philosophy, comparative law, and anthropology to better 
understand comparison in practice. This Article argues that while we 
are entangled in the questions of sameness and difference, of finding 
the function and tying together, we are still not asking the question 
of comparison. What is function and how is it related to comparison? 
Inspired by James Tully’s writings, the Article explores the aspectival 
views of the legal world suggested by the different games of com-
parison. The Article draws on Stephen Mulhall’s work on Wittgenstein’s 
seeing as, aspect dawning, and aspect blindness to further ask about 
our relationship to comparison. The Article shows how mainstream 
comparisons are ontic comparisons that think togetherness through 
the comparatist. The comparatist steers the belonging together and 
(un)makes the meaning of all things in mainstream comparison. The 
argument builds on earlier work by Igor Stramignoni, showing how 
the Western legal tradition is within a kind of Heideggerian calcula-
tive thinking. The Article explores the possibility of other kinds of com-
parison through Stramignoni’s poetic comparisons. This Article calls 
on us to slow down our comparisons and begin to question comparison 
itself.
IntroductIon
A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that’s unlocked and 
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 1. LudwIg wIttgensteIn, cuLture and VaLue 42e (G.H. von Wright ed., Peter 
Winch trans., Basil Blackwell 2d ed. 1980).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distri-
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The thirteenth century gave us one of the earliest statements on 
reasoning in law:
If new and unusual matters arise which have not before 
been seen in the realm, [If like matters arise let them be de-
cided by like, since the occasion is a good one for proceeding 
a similibus ad similia.] and their judgment is difficult and 
unclear, let them be adjourned to the great court to be there 
determined by counsel of the court, [though there are some 
who, presuming on their own knowledge, as though nothing 
connected with the law were beyond their competence, are 
unwilling to seek the counsel of anyone,] [since] it is more 
becoming and more lawyer-like to take counsel rather than 
to determine anything rashly, nor is it discreditable to be in 
doubt as to individual cases.2
The English common law emerged largely from unwritten law and 
local customs that varied between each county, legislation affirmed 
mostly what the courts were already doing.3 Previous decisions were 
not binding, but wise judges used their own recollections of prior cases 
as guidance.4 There was a wider movement from memory to writing 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which also informed legal 
practice, leading to increased reporting of cases.5 The earliest known 
reports of cases detailing the words of litigants, their counsel, and 
judges date from 1244.6 Henry Bracton made notes from two thousand 
 2. In the passage, similibus ad similia can be found in italic brackets because 
it was part of Bracton’s additions and supplementary passages, taken into the text by 
his editor or redactor. 2 Henry Bracton, Bracton on tHe Laws and customs of engLand 
21 (Samuel Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968). Prior to Bracton, there were 
two twelfth-century books describing English law. See raLpH V. turner, tHe engLIsH 
JudIcIary In tHe age of gLanVILL and Bracton, c. 1176–1239, at 38–40 (1985). Summae 
were an attempt to organize and make sense of the many different documents in a lo-
gical way. See m.t. cLancHy, from memory to wrItten record engLand 1066–1307, at 
108–10 (3d ed. 2013).
 3. Legal history is contested. J.W. Tubbs reexamined Bracton’s writings and 
challenged the evidence for the view that custom was the only way of understanding 
the common law during the medieval period. Tubbs uncovered the role of writs in the 
development of the common law; he also exposed how Bracton’s definitions of law and 
custom relied heavily on Roman law sources. See J.w. tuBBs, tHe common Law mInd 
1–20 (2000); Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (pt. 1), 2 oxford 
u. commonweaLtH L.J. 155, 157–165, 169 (2002).
 4. Larry aLexander & emILy sHerwIn, demystIfyIng LegaL reasonIng 28 (2008).
 5. Written records proved to be a useful tool for governing, allowing for the 
creation of centralized archives and as a way of memory making; for example, post-
Norman Conquest, the Domesday Book (1086) collected the oral verdicts of thousands 
of jurors and translated these into Latin. Nevertheless, the oral tradition continued 
for more than two centuries after the Norman Conquest. See cLancHy, supra note 2, at 
19–44, 66. Many historians argue that Henry II, in the twelfth century, set the common 
law in motion by establishing a centralized institutional framework, whereas others 
suggest it began much later in seventeenth century. See Postema, supra note 3, at 
157–58.
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cases for his summa on the Laws and Customs of England.7 The work 
has been cited as the basis for the doctrine of precedent.8 Bracton lib-
erally peppered his writings with prior cases, but the reason for this 
toil was to show how the more contemporary cases were distorting the 
earlier case law.9 Consequently, our current way of moving from like to 
like may seem topsy-turvy when viewed through Bracton’s work, since 
we now understand the most recent like-case ratio by a superior court 
to be binding.10 Proceeding de similibus ad similia is often said to be 
a distinguishing feature of the English common law, in contrast to 
Roman law; and yet, it was actually a standard part of a Roman legal 
doctrine that emphasized the authority of a group of cases creating a 
precedent.11 The maxim stare decisis et not quieta movere, meaning to 
“stand by things decided and not to disturb settled points,” was ori-
ginally found in a canonical expression.12 Between the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the present doctrine of stare decisis was 
adopted, assisted by the greater reporting of local cases, which also in-
creased the importance of judicial opinions.13 John Selden aptly called 
the common law the English Janus: every decision involves a fine bal-
ance with one face fixed on the past, while the other draws (onto) the 
future.14 But, why must we treat like cases alike? This Article emerges 
from a reflection on the question of the essential, yet tacit, role com-
parison plays in law.
The Article seeks to show how the question of comparison is im-
portant to all legal scholars, not only those working in the field of 
comparative legal studies. The Article approaches the relationship 
between comparison and law in three distinct Parts. Part I displays 
the stake comparison has in the workings of law, the doctrine of pre-
cedent, legal reasoning, and legal theory by providing detailed and 
precise examples. The Article then delves further into the historical 
 7. Bracton, supra note 2, at 19.
 8. aLfred dennIng, wHat next In tHe Law 5 (1982).
 9. tuBBs, supra note 3, at 19–20.
 10. See gary sLapper & daVId KeLLy, tHe engLIsH LegaL system: 2016–2017, at 137 
(17th ed. 2016).
 11. tuBBs, supra note 3, at 19–20.
 12. Scott Hershovitz, Integrity and Stare Decisis, in expLorIng Law’s empIre: tHe 
JurIsprudence of ronaLd dworKIn 103, 104 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006). See also neIL 
maccormIcK, rHetorIc and tHe ruLe of Law: a tHeory of LegaL reasonIng 128 (2005). 
(“The argument from precedent says that if a statutory provision has previously been 
subject to judicial interpretation, it ought to be interpreted in conformity with the in-
terpretation given to it by other courts.”)
 13. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (pt. 2), 3 oxford 
u. commonweaLtH L.J. 1, 12 (2003); A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal 
Theory, in oxford essays In JurIsprudence 77–78 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973); tuBBs, 
supra note 3, at 18.
 14. Jani Anglorum Facies Altera (1610): see J.g.a. pococK, tHe ancIent constItutIon 
and tHe feudaL Law: a study of engLIsH HIstorIcaL tHougHt In tHe seVenteentH century 
36 (1957); Allen D. Boyer, Sir Edward Coke, Ciceronianus: Classical Rhetoric and the 
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development of treating like cases alike to find out when and how it 
came to be and explores insights by legal theorists. The reader can 
rest assured, what follows is not an ill-conceived attempt to write an 
all-embracing linear history of the common law. Legal history is con-
tested and constantly rediscovering itself. The Article does not even 
seek to partially reconstruct an account of the history of the common 
law; instead, it is an attempt to shine a light on something important, 
and that something will become clearer as the Article unfolds. Part II 
turns to examining comparison itself through the rich literature on 
comparative legal studies together with insights from philosophy 
and anthropology. The Article draws heavily on James Tully’s work 
on Ludwig Wittgenstein to highlight the aspectival character of com-
parison. Part II begins by asking the literature, “What is comparison?” 
The Article explores comparison by embracing the common law trad-
ition of practice, offering a glimpse into how comparison works in the 
unique space where law and comparison are openly present together. 
Part III considers the thinking underlying the current literature on 
comparison. It analyzes mainstream comparison, and our relationship 
to comparison, through insights from Wittgenstein’s seeing as, aspect 
dawning, and aspect blindness. The Article argues that our main-
stream legal comparisons are steering togetherness and approaching 
comparison in an ontic way. The Article explores Heidegger’s in-
sights on the ontological difference: the difference between a being 
and Being. Part III examines Igor Stramignoni’s work on poetic com-
parisons, which introduces some of Martin Heidegger’s later thinking 
to comparative law. It dwells on the distinction between calculative 
and meditative thinking. The argument builds on Stramignoni’s work 
showing how the mainstream approaches to comparative law are in 
a Heideggerian calculative thinking. Stramignoni’s work asks, can we 
rethink comparative law afresh?15 This Article seeks to build on some 
of these insights by returning to language and asking the question of 
comparison itself. I should add, this Article does not seek to answer 
the question of comparison; instead, it seeks to bring to your attention 
how we are not yet asking the question of comparison, and why we 
should.
I. tHe LegaL worLd turns on comparIson
A. Custom and Reason
The English common law has long been a practice largely con-
sisting of custom and reason. Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Davies, 
in the seventeenth century, maintained that the common law could 
not be reduced to writing because it was to be found in the memory 
 15. Igor Stramignoni, The King’s One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought, and 
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and customs of the people: it was a continuous practice.16 On the one 
hand, customs were considered immemorial; but on the other, they 
were malleable. Law required a refined art of reason. It evolved as a 
system of laws, customs, and reason; and reason meant “reason in the 
law”: each judgment had to fit, be reasonable, and consistent with the 
whole of the local practice.17 While reason in law can be found in medi-
eval sources, it was only seventeenth-century writings that made the 
relationship explicit.18 The distinction between natural reason and 
legal reasoning also became clearer in the seventeenth century, when 
judges and lawyers started reflecting a little more on the practice of 
law.19 Sir Edward Coke famously defined law as “artificial reason”: 
a learned art of reasoning from within the practice of law based on 
experience.20 It was Coke’s admiration of rhetoric that led him to 
distinguish “artificial reason” from natural reasoning, based on the 
way rhetoricians distinguish “artificial logic” from natural reason.21 
Today, rhetoric does not speak to us in the same way.22 The fall of 
rhetoric can only be understood when it is situated, acknowledging 
both the ancient rift between Plato and the sophists, and the current 
scientific grounding of this age, which created binary oppositions be-
tween “true knowledge” and partial, incomplete truths informed by 
our prejudices.23 While rhetoric may have lost its tongue, we must be 
careful not to uproot law from its proper home. Rhetoric and law have 
 16. Postema, supra note 3, at 169; Stramignoni, supra note 15, at 36.
 17. Postema, supra note 3, at 178; Postema, supra note 13, at 10.
 18. tuBBs, supra note 3, at 148.
 19. Postema, supra note 3, at 157.
 20. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, 
Hale, 103 yaLe L.J. 1651, 1689–1694 (1994). The common law required a different kind 
of skilled reasoning: reason in law was the result of immersion in the practice of law; 
it entailed pragmatically finding solutions to legal problems in each case and with 
an eye to later cases. See Postema, supra note 13, at 2–9. Sir Edward Coke saw the 
common law as “nothing else but reason which is to be understood [as] an artificial 
perfection of reason gotten by long study, observation, and experience”: see Coke in 
Berman, supra, at 1690. Coke’s writings are a product of many years of experience, 
crafted through Ciceronian rhetoric, which was back in fashion in the Elizabethan age. 
See Boyer, supra note 14, at 4. See also J.H. Baker’s reflections on Coke’s writings in 
J.H. BaKer, an IntroductIon to engLIsH LegaL HIstory 189 (4th ed. 2011).
 21. Boyer, supra note 14, at 32.
 22. C.S. Lewis once called rhetoric “the greatest barrier between us and our an-
cestors”: c.s. LewIs, engLIsH LIterature In tHe sIxteentH century excLudIng drama 61 
(1994). Lewis understood the importance of rhetoric, not only in the sixteenth century, 
but also in the Greek world: “Nearly all our older poetry was written and read by 
men to whom the distinction between poetry and rhetoric, in its modern form, would 
have been meaningless”: id. at 61. Today, rhetoric has come to be a term of disparage-
ment. See peter goodrIcH, LegaL dIscourse studIes In LInguIstIcs, rHetorIc and LegaL 
anaLysIs 85 (1987); Boyer, supra note 14, at 10; sandra Berns, to speaK as a Judge: 
dIfference, VoIce and power 157 (1999).
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always belonged together: the first known teachers of rhetoric taught 
the first rule-based methods for handling judicial disputes.24
B. Deciding Like Cases Alike
Proceeding from like to like has always been at the heart of legal 
reasoning.25 Bracton’s advice to move from like to like in law remains 
sound, but we would also need to go back further to find the source of 
a similibus ad similia in Aristotle’s writings.26 For Bracton, deciding 
like cases alike was a principle of interpretation known as the “equity 
of a statute,” which extended the statute beyond its literal words to 
situations of “mischief” equal to those covered by the statute.27 The 
equity of a statute, a form of analogical reasoning, enabled the law to 
extend itself into a new situation without exposing itself. In short, it 
 24. The first known teachers of rhetoric—Gorgias, Corax, and his pupil Tisias, 
in Greek Sicily—taught methods for handling judicial disputes. There were no public 
prosecutors; citizens had to argue their own cases in a single speech, hence the focus on 
being able to articulate oneself coherently. See BrIan VIcKers, In defence of rHetorIc 
6 (2d ed. 1997). See also tHomas m. conLey, rHetorIc In tHe european tradItIon (1990). 
Law has always been linked to rhetoric. Sixteenth-century sources show those who 
studied at the Inns of Court studied Ciceronian rhetoric. There are also many different 
scholarly works on rhetoric and the law from the same period: see peter goodrIcH, 
Languages of Law from LogIcs of memory to nomadIc masKs 92–93, 102 (1990). We 
will forgo a detailed analysis of the fundamental relationship between law and rhet-
oric, as much has already been written on this subject. See, e.g., Berns, supra note 22; 
goodrIcH, supra note 22; Boyer, supra note 14, at 10.
 25. Judges use inductive reasoning and reasoning by analogy to decide cases. At 
first glance, it may seem that legal reasoning requires deductive logic to apply the es-
tablished legal principle to the facts of the case. The ratio (general principle) of a case 
is never explicitly separated out from a previous case and applied mechanically; rather, 
the ratio of the previous relevant case is determined by the judge in the current case 
based on the particular facts of the prior case. See sLapper & KeLLy, supra note 10, at 
502–03. Legal reasoning involves analogical reasoning from one case to the next: see 
LLoyd L. weInreB, LegaL reason: tHe use of anaLogy In LegaL argument (2005). Gerald 
Postema also shows how analogical reasoning is found throughout the legal system 
since the medieval period; it can also be found in the construction of statutes by way 
of the ejusdem generis doctrine. See Gerald J. Postema, Analogical Thinking in Law, 
in common Law tHeory 102, 103–04 (Douglas Edlin ed., 2007). See also cass sunsteIn, 
LegaL reasonIng and poLItIcaL confLIct 62, 62 (1996) (“Much of legal reasoning is ana-
logical: is case A like case B? Or instead like case C?”). Cass Sunstein suggests that 
reasoning by analogy in law has four overlapping features: (i) principled consistency, 
(ii) focus on particulars, (iii) incompletely theorized judgments, and (iv) principles op-
erating at a low or intermediate level of abstraction. sunsteIn, supra, at 67–69. Not 
all legal theorists share the view that analogical legal decision making is a distinct, 
acquired craft. Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin argue that judges have no special 
decision-making tools; rather, judges resolving disputes by analogy intuitively perceive 
similarities between cases or apply rules of similarity using ordinary reasoning. See 
aLexander & sHerwIn, supra note 4, at 104, 234. An interesting recent development 
and approach to analogical legal reasoning (ALR) has been the use of empirical data 
analyzing U.S. maritime salvage cases to create a formal model of judicial behavior in 
this area. See Joshua Teitelbaum, Analogical Legal Reasoning: Theory and Evidence, 
17 am. L. econ. reV. 160 (2015).
 26. Reasoning from part to part and from like to like can be traced to Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics and Rhetoric. See rIcHard mcKeon, tHe BasIc worKs of arIstotLe 103 
(2001); See Postema, supra note 25, at 106.
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provided the law with a way to bridge the gap created by the new situ-
ation of “equal mischief.” Yet, there was no general theory explaining 
how the “equity of a statute” concept worked, or how situations of 
“equal mischief” were defined.28 Alas, we are left to wonder what it 
was that made one case of “equal mischief” warrant the application of 
a statute where it did not literally belong: What was “alike” and why?
A precedent can function either as a rule or an analogy, depending 
on the similarities and differences between the present case and the 
precedent.29 Prior decisions deemed similar to the present case are 
relevant, and often prove pivotal to the way in which the present case 
is decided.30 Where there are significant dissimilarities between the 
current case and the precedent, a court may choose to distinguish a 
precedent and create a new path. It is self-evident how the law moves 
from like to like, but one cannot simply say so; it must be shown in 
what follows. For example, one of the basic elements necessary for 
criminal liability, mens rea, can be found through likeness. The doc-
trine of transferred malice shows how a defendant can be found guilty 
of an offence where she intended the same crime against two dif-
ferent victims: for example, the defendant strikes X with a belt but 
also strikes Y (Latimer); transferred malice cannot apply where the 
defendant intended a different offence than the one committed; for in-
stance, a defendant throws stones at X but misses, hitting a window 
(Pembliton).31
The way law moves from like to like can be traced through the 
different ways similarities and differences have played an important 
role in cases interpreting the mens rea element for recklessness. 
To be as succinct as possible, we will focus on three main cases: the 
Cunningham test for recklessness (subjective), the Caldwell test (ob-
jective), and again Cunningham via G (objective).32 R v. Cunningham 
 28. The “equity of a statute” concept has been traced back to Bracton. It was 
widely applied in the fifteenth century; however, later texts (the Year Books) did not 
disclose any further explanations about how it worked. See tuBBs, supra note 27, at 
40–41.
 29. sunsteIn, supra note 25, at 71–72.
 30. Mirehouse v. Rennell (1833) 6 Eng. Rep. 1015; 1 Cl & Fin 527, 547 (UK) (“Our 
common-law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances 
those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents; and for 
the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we must apply those rules, 
where they are not plainly unreasonable and inconvenient, to all cases which arise; and 
we are not at liberty to reject them, and to abandon all analogy to them, in those to 
which they have not yet been judicially applied, because we think that the rules are not 
as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves could have devised. It appears to me to be 
of great importance to keep this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the 
determination of the particular case, but for the interests of law as a science.”).
 31. R v. Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359, 361 (UK); R v. Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 
119, 122 (UK).
 32. R v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (UK); R v. Caldwell [1982] AC 341 (HL) 
(UK); R v. G [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034. There are many other significant 
cases. This Part is only meant to provide a basic overview, showing how the law moves 
from like to like; it will not provide a comprehensive analysis of the case law in this 
complex area. The examples are merely the tip of the iceberg, illustrating how the law 
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refined and developed a “subjective” test for recklessness: to be reck-
less, the defendant would have had to appreciate that there was a 
risk that someone’s property might be damaged and yet commit 
the act anyway.33 R v. Caldwell distinguished the previous case of 
Cunningham as having “no bearing” on the meaning of “reckless,” 
as Parliament had recently replaced the earlier legislation which 
grounded the Cunningham test.34 A new test was devised by Lord 
Diplock:
In my opinion, a person charged with an offence under sec-
tion 1 (1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 is “reckless as to 
whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged 
if” (1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk 
that property will be destroyed or damaged and (2) when he 
does the act he either has not given any thought to the pos-
sibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that 
there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to 
do it. That would be a proper direction to the jury; cases in 
the Court of Appeal which held otherwise should be regarded 
as overruled.35
This became known as the Caldwell test, and was widely viewed as 
changing the test for recklessness in Cunningham from a subjective 
test to an objective standard.36
 33. The Malicious Damage Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97 (UK), had caused some 
confusion with the word “maliciously,” so there were many cases to refine this technical 
term, culminating in R v. Cunningham. Cunningham approved a definition formulated 
in 1902 by Courtney Stanhope Kenny:
In any statutory definition of crime, malice must be taken . . . as requiring 
either (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact 
was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not 
(i.e., the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be 
done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it).
Quoted in Caldwell, [1982] AC at 351 (Lord Diplock); Cunningham, [1957] 2 QB at 398.
 34. Parliament replaced the Malicious Damage Act 1861 with the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971. The new Act provided an opportunity to tidy up the previous, im-
practical distinctions and revisit the meaning of recklessness. See Criminal Damage 
Act 1971, c. 48, § 1 (UK); Caldwell, [1982] AC at 351. Lord Diplock, in R v. Caldwell, did 
not see why there needed to be a distinction between someone who had foreseen the 
risk and continued anyway, and a person who had not thought about the risk to others 
of his act, as these were both blameworthy, and only the accused would know his/her 
thought processes. See Caldwell, [1982] AC at 352.
 35. Caldwell, [1982] AC at 354 (Lord Diplock).
 36. Cath Crosby, Recklessness: The Continuing Search for a Definition, 72 J. crIm. 
L. 313 (2008); Kumaralingam Amirthalingamn, Caldwell Recklessness Is Dead, Long 
Live Mens Rea’s Fecklessness, 67 mod. L. reV. 491 (2004); JoHn cHILd & daVId ormerod, 
smItH, Hogan, and ormerod’s essentIaLs of crImInaL Law (2d ed. 2017). Those com-
menting on Caldwell have mostly critiqued the approach taken. A few writers have 
praised Lord Diplock’s approach in Caldwell, but they have suggested it should not 
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The Caldwell test was applied in Elliot v. C, where a fourteen year 
old had poured white spirit on the floor of a shed and set it alight, 
destroying the shed.37 During the trial, it was submitted that the 
subjective test should be applied to establish whether this particular 
fourteen-year-old defendant appreciated the fact that there was an ob-
vious risk of setting the shed on fire. She did not appreciate the risk, 
therefore, she was found not guilty of arson.38 This decision was re-
versed, because the Caldwell test required that it be an “obvious risk” 
to a reasonably prudent person and not necessarily to the particular 
defendant.39 Goff, L.J., reluctantly applied Caldwell, feeling compelled 
to follow the precedent of the House of Lords, because the Caldwell 
decision was deemed similar to the facts in Elliot v. C.40
We may feel some dissatisfaction with the way in which Elliot v. C 
was decided, especially when it is compared with the similar case of 
R v. G, which also concerned children.41 In G, the defendants had set 
fire to some newspapers in a large plastic bin, causing damage costing 
one million pounds; they were charged and convicted of arson.42 The 
House of Lords quashed their conviction, and revisited the Caldwell 
decision. The Caldwell decision was critiqued because it had failed to 
follow the intentions of Parliament when it treated Cunningham as 
irrelevant to the construction of “reckless”. The Cunningham test had 
been endorsed by a law commission report discussing the new act, 
and Parliament had not specified any other meaning of “reckless.”43 
The House also noted the Caldwell decision was a “radical departure” 
from the previous law.44 Given the fact that Elliot v. C and R v. G in-
volved children and a similar act, and the fact that like cases should 
be decided alike, we may view the different outcomes in these deci-
sions as undesirable. These cases illustrate the problem: What is it 
that tips the fine balance, causing us to find the well-trodden path of 
past decisions inadequate to address our current problem? Did Lord 
 37. Elliot v. C (a Minor) [1983] 1 WLR 939, 943–44 (UK).
 38. The risk was not obvious to the defendant. The defendant had not thought 
about the risk, or handled white spirit before, and she also had a learning difficulty. See 
id. at 945.
 39. Id. at 945.
 40. See id. at 947–48 (Goff, LJ).
 41. R v. G [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034 (UK).
 42. Contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, § 1(1). The trial judge was bound 
to follow the Caldwell test, and no allowance was given for age or immaturity. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal: R v. G, [2004] 1 AC at 1034–43.
 43. Lord Bingham examined how Parliament intended for the term “reckless” 
in the 1971 Act to be interpreted, by turning back to the Law Commission report and 
looking at why the changes were made to the legislation. Lord Bingham found that 
the Caldwell judgment had misinterpreted the law, R v. G, [2004] 1 AC at 1054. Lord 
Bingham also pointed to other failings in the Caldwell approach: the basic rule of crim-
inal law actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the obvious unfairness in subsequent 
cases bound to apply Caldwell, and the concerns expressed by academics and judges, 
id. at 1055. See also id. at 1058–59 (Lord Steyn, concurring).
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Diplock see too many differences where there were few? What is the 
breaking point, where something becomes so radically different that 
it is no longer part of the continuous evolution, but warrants a new 
beginning? How many differences do we need to cross the Rubicon? 
And why, exactly, do like cases need to be treated alike? The doctrine 
of precedent, where like cases are decided alike, is one of the instances 
to first make comparison visible in the legal world.
C. Sustaining Integrity
Comparison is omnipresent in precedent and it also creeps into 
our justification for it. For Ronald Dworkin, between justice, fairness, 
and due process lies integrity.45 Integrity does what justice and fair-
ness cannot do by justifying precedent. Integrity explains why we do 
not resort to checkerboard solutions of justice, where like cases are not 
decided in a similar manner, even when these have an internal fair-
ness.46 Essentially, “checkerboard” is where like is not treated alike 
for arbitrary reasons. Integrity is not simply about repeating past 
decisions; it is a commitment to a common coherence and an under-
standing of how previous decisions should influence the present.47 
 45. Dworkin divides integrity into two practical principles: (i) integrity in legislation, 
which requires those creating law keep law coherent in principle; (ii) integrity in adjudi-
cation, which requires those deciding what the law is and enforcing it act in a coherent 
manner. Integrity in adjudication explains why the past has a special power in court. “It 
explains why judges must conceive the body of law they administer as a whole rather than 
as a set of discrete decisions that they are free to make or amend one by one, with nothing 
but a strategic interest in the rest”: ronaLd dworKIn, Law’s empIre 167 (1998).
 46. Id. at 180–83. “Checkerboard” is where the law treats similar situations dif-
ferently. See id. at 179 (“Most of us, I think, would be dismayed by “checkerboard” laws 
that treat similar accidents or occasions of racial discrimination or abortion differ-
ently on arbitrary grounds.”). “Checkerboard” statutes are problematic because they 
breach the ideal of integrity. The United States Constitution, at its inception, with the 
counting of slaves as three-fifths all other persons is one of Dworkin’s examples of a 
“checkerboard” statute. Id. at 184. When thinking about why we oppose “checkerboard” 
statutes Dworkin comes to the ideal of integrity. Dworkin suggests that integrity is 
law’s Neptune because we can only make sense of the behavior of the other planets 
(justice and fairness) if we recognize the presence of another undiscovered planet (in-
tegrity). Id at 183. For a detailed explanation of Dworkin’s notion of “checkerboard” so-
lution, see Dale Smith, The Many Faces of Political Integrity, in expLorIng Law’s empIre: 
tHe JurIsprudence of ronaLd dworKIn, supra note 12, at 119, 120−25.
 47. Gerald Postema identifies six main components of the idea of integrity: 
(1) integrity is a norm of unification, and those bound by integrity view the community 
as a single moral agent; (2) integrity draws together principles and norms from past 
decisions: it asks for internal justification; (3) integrity seeks principles of justice and 
fairness; (4) integrity calls on officials and citizens to view their practice as a coherent 
(i.e., intelligible) set of principles (in a weak sense), in other words, integrity views co-
herence as an ideal; (5) integrity is historically situated, and takes past decisions as a 
point of departure; (6) integrity requires officials and citizens to find common, public 
principles of justice in their shared past. See Gerald J. Postema, Integrity: Justice 
in Workclothes, in dworKIn and HIs crItIcs 291, 294–95 (Justine Burley ed., 2004). 
Postema does not simply outline Dworkin’s theory of integrity; there are many aspects 
where he disagrees with Dworkin’s approach. For example, Postema suggests integrity 
should have a self-critical attitude which he calls “regret”: without this element, the in-
terpretation of our past is “disengaged.” Dworkin’s postulate of showing legal practice 
in its “best light” sees those elements of the practice that do not fit the interpretation 
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Judges are constrained by the need to show the law in its best possible 
light, and any new interpretation must “fit” the existing legal prac-
tice and past decisions.48 Integrity is a way of rooting new decisions 
in, and fitting them within, previous decisions of the law.49 Integrity 
is a commitment displayed over time.50 The idea is that we want the 
state to act as a moral agent with a coherent set of principles.51 Such 
a commitment to coherence and integrity, still requires comparison. 
Judges committed to integrity justify their decisions on the basis of 
certain similarities between the current case and the previous cases; 
or else they distinguish a previous case on the basis of a difference, 
before referring to another case they deem similar.52 Integrity keeps 
the narrative going, but only through comparison. The workhorse is 
comparison, and integrity is sustained by it; and yet, it would seem in-
tegrity has a binding force that comparison does not. Gerald Postema 
summarizes how integrity in law informs current decisions:
 48. Id. at 225–38; Costas Douzinas et al., Is Hermes Hercules’ Twin? Hermeneutics 
and Legal Theory, in readIng dworKIn crItIcaLLy 123, 134–35 (Alun Hunt ed., 1992). 
Dworkin refines constructive interpretation into three main stages of interpretation: 
(i) the pre-interpretive stage: a judge selects her materials, whereby the rules and 
standards of the practice are identified; (ii) the interpretive stage: the interpreter set-
tles on a general justification for the main elements selected in the pre-interpretive 
stage; (iii) the post-interpretive stage, or a reforming stage, allowing the interpreter to 
adjust her arguments made in the interpretive stage to serve what the practice “really” 
needs. See dworKIn, supra note 45, at 65–66. Dworkin concedes that actual interpret-
ation is less deliberate and consists of “seeing” the dimensions and the purpose/aim of 
the practice. Id. at 66–67.
 49. dworKIn, supra note 45, at 228. See also id. at 255 (“Judges who accept the 
interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set 
of principles about people’s rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of 
the political structure and the legal doctrine of their community. They try to make that 
complex structure and record the best these can be. It is analytically useful to distin-
guish different dimension or aspects of any working theory. It will include convictions 
about both fit and justification.”).
 50. When we examine a person’s actions as a whole, integrity emerges as com-
mitment to a coherent moral view. In the same way, we want people to act in a prin-
cipled way towards us, even if acting in a principled and morally coherent way does 
not mean that people always act in the right way. See Hershovitz, supra note 12, at 114 
(“Someone who acts with integrity may nevertheless do something she ought not to do 
from time to time. But someone who acts without integrity, someone who acts incoher-
ently or capriciously in matters of importance, simply cannot be acting morally except 
by happenstance. A lack of integrity signifies a lack of a commitment to act morally.”). 
Courts can also display integrity through time when we examine its decisions as a 
whole and find a pattern of coherent and defensible decisions: id. at 115.
 51. dworKIn, supra note 45, at 166.
 52. Integrity was a third position between formalism and realism. Integrity was a 
way of reconciling Dworkin’s view of law as a closed system with some liberal freedom. 
See Douzinas et al., supra note 48, at 133. There are many important disagreements 
between Dworkin and other theorists in the field which will not be addressed. For in-
stance, Douzinas et al. showed how Dworkin’s theory of interpretation was an impov-
erished Gadamerian hermeneutics. See id. at 135. Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin 
disagreed about the difference between “explaining” and “changing.” See stanLey fIsH, 
Working on the Chain Gang, in doIng wHat comes naturaLLy, supra note 23, at 87; 






/ajcl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ajcl/avab003/6245987 by guest on 26 April 2021
12 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. XX
Law is a framework of practical reasoning that anchors the 
public justification of decisions and actions to past communal 
decisions and actions. This is not exclusively true of reasoning 
from precedent, but it is most clearly and immediately evi-
dent there. Reasoning from precedent by analogy is not mere 
imitation, nor is it a matter of prediction, nor some version of 
formal consistency. It is an evaluatively informed assessment 
of the normative significance of the past decision for the in-
stant case, as well as of the significance it might hold for the 
future.53
Still, we do not simply stumble over the inherent similarity be-
tween two cases. Similarity between one case and another is argued 
for; in other words, it has to be established, it is a relational argument 
which can be disputed by a later case or by another judge.54 Similarity 
is not simply “there” in a case for a judge in a later case to find it. It is 
an assessment of which previous case is similar and pertinent to the 
present circumstances. Dworkin does not deny that there are many 
disagreements about whether a particular rule or principle should be 
cited; indeed, he acknowledges, “the argument for a particular rule 
may be more important than the argument from that rule to the par-
ticular case.”55 Again, we could ask the same questions: how similar 
does a case need to be in order to be relevant and significant, and 
when can we say that something is so radically different as to be dis-
tinguished from previous cases? Dworkin’s argument is that despite 
the disagreements among judges about which rule or case applies, 
they all agree that earlier decisions do exert a gravitational pull.56 
So, where does the gravitational force from previous cases come from? 
Writing in Law’s Empire, the later Dworkin would say the force was a 
manifestation of integrity and that integrity is both something more 
and less than consistency.57 Integrity is helpful to explain why past 
decisions should inform our current actions and why we cannot settle 
for checkerboard solutions. However, in asking how integrity works, 
we go straight back to debates about similarities and differences and 
to comparison. Questions generated by comparison seem to be of little 
interest. What is the relationship between comparison and integrity? 
 53. Postema, supra note 47, at 312.
 54. fIsH, supra note 23, at 94.
 55. ronaLd dworKIn, taKIng rIgHts serIousLy 112 (1977).
 56. Id.
 57. dworKIn, supra note 45, at 219 (“Is integrity only consistency (deciding like 
cases alike) under a prouder name? That depends on what we mean by consistency or 
like cases. If a political institution is consistent only when it repeats its own past deci-
sions most closely or precisely in point, then integrity is not consistency; it is something 
both more and less. Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be 
both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of 
justice and fairness in the right relation. An institution that accepts that ideal will 
sometimes, for that reason, depart from a narrow line of past decisions in search of 
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How are they linked? How does comparison allow integrity to func-
tion? And why does comparison lie in integrity? These are not ques-
tions receiving too much attention. It could be just that there is little 
to say about comparison, but then, we would have already decided its 
place and function as a helpful tool.
In an earlier text, Dworkin offers a slightly different answer to 
the question, Where does the gravitational force from previous cases 
come from?
The gravitational force of a precedent may be explained by 
appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the 
fairness of treating like cases alike. A precedent is the report 
of an earlier political decision; the very fact of that decision, 
as a piece of political history, provides some reason for de-
ciding other cases in a similar way.58
Early Dworkin finds the gravitational pull of previous cases in the 
fairness of treating like cases alike, that is, by comparison. A similar 
previous decision, thanks to its status as history, provides sufficient 
reason to ground the decision in a later case. Dworkin’s earlier and 
later positions can be reconciled, reflecting on why like cases should 
be treated alike: the later Dworkin finds integrity. In any case, com-
parison is prevalent in and thusly has a relationship to these all. Yet, 
comparison is seldom discussed; and if it is at all considered, it is seen 
as a vehicle for integrity, making it possible to treat like cases alike, 
without, however, being worthy of further questioning. Why does com-
parison reside in, and in-between, justice, fairness, and due process?
D. Courtroom Comparisons
The legal world seems saturated with comparisons. Comparison 
is embedded in the language of the court room. Reformulating what 
people say in the courtroom occurs frequently because it is a controlled 
sphere; discourse must follow a preestablished course; one must speak 
at appropriate times and in the language of the court.59 Reformulation 
not only masks an imbalance of power between the one speaking and 
the one subtly correcting, but it also requires comparison. Recent 
 58. dworKIn, supra note 55, at 112–13. Dworkin distinguishes between (a) the en-
actment force of a precedent, which requires later judges to follow the rules/principles 
in the earlier cases as if these were laid down in statutes, and (b) the gravitational 
force of precedents, which “tugs on later cases that are plainly beyond the language of 
any such rule or principle”: see id. at 318. There is a helpful section in Dworkin’s reply 
to Greenwalt’s critique where Dworkin clarifies his notion of “gravitational force.” Id. 
at 113, 318–22.
 59. goodrIcH, supra note 24, at 193–208. See also id. at 197 (“Paraphrase, of 
course, may involve either a relation of equivalence or symmetrical substitution be-
tween elements (words, expressions, propositions) such that the elements a and b 
“mean the same thing” in the relevant discourse, or a relation of implication or orien-
tated substitutability such that the relation of substitution a to b is not the same as 
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studies have shown the power of questioning as a tool to create tweaks 
in the complainant’s account that help create a narrative the defense 
wants to push.60 In addition to courtroom comparisons, there are com-
parisons between judgments, consisting of a highly selective recall of 
relevant “facts.”61 Comparison is at the center of every judgment. The 
adversarial legal system cannot function without comparison. When 
deciding a case, there is a weighing up, a comparison, of the argu-
ments to see whether the defense or the prosecution has the stronger 
case. Judges often have differences of opinion, and there are many 
dissenting opinions and arguments that are “weighed” or “balanced” 
against one another in law.62 The idea of judges weighing up legal ar-
guments and past decisions is not in itself enough to guide judges in 
reaching a decision.63 Again, what tips the balance one way or another? 
What is implied in weighing up?64 Comparison is part and parcel of 
our apothegm: like cases should be treated alike. Comparison is a key 
component of legal reasoning. We move from like to like within the 
system of precedent. Whenever we apply or distinguish a case, we are 
doing comparison. Law conceals its comparisons. Whenever law talks 
of “reasonableness,” it speaks of comparison. Reasonableness requires 
 60. John M. Conley and William O’Barr highlight the power imbalance, showing 
how defense lawyers cross-examining complainants develop narratives through their 
questioning. The book includes excerpts of court transcripts; one extracts shows how 
the complainant’s words are “upgraded” by the defense lawyer, from “very smug” to 
“arrogant” to help create the narrative that the alleged victim was scorned and sought 
revenge. JoHn m. conLey & wILLIam m. o’Barr, Just words: Law, Language and power 
esp. 15–38 (2d ed. 2005).
 61. Sandra Berns highlights how the facts of a case can be constructed in a multi-
plicity of ways leading to different legal implications. See Berns, supra note 22, at 
176–83.
 62. maccormIcK, supra note 12, at 337.
 63. aLexander & sHerwIn, supra note 4, at 102. Legal texts and proceedings are 
not simple or unitary, within legal proceedings there comes the moment: “[W]hen no 
testimony remains to be given; no argument remains to be put. All is in the balance, 
awaiting judgment. If the judge is to be ‘properly judicial’ she has no alternative but to 
act”: Berns, supra note 22, at 162.
 64. See id. at 166–67 (“On every side arguments are offered, this explanation 
rather than that, these authorities in preference to those, this truth in preference to 
that. At the moment of judgment, what had been fecund and plural becomes singular, 
unitary. Only at the moment of judgment (and only where the decision is that of a 
single judge) can this singularity be sustained, even for a moment. Once the judge 
must herself justify her decision, construct written arguments which have the po-
tential to persuade her sister judges that her decision is proper fecundity returns as 
she seeks ways of justifying her decisions to others, shapes arguments and reasons 
which will persuade them. Generations of law students have embarked upon a quest 
for the ratio decidendi, the reason for judgment, and the single authoritative sentence 
that epitomises law. Yet reason is seldom, if ever, as perspicacious as this endeavour 
suggests. Allusion, image, the dense accretion of fact and symbol and argument, the 
weaving of these into a whole which (if successful) draws the mind irresistibly in a 
particular direction: all of these highlight the rhetorical structure of the written judg-
ment. Those who attempt to reduce plurality to singularity are likely to be unable to 
capture the reasons why a particular judgment is, or is not, persuasive. Even more to 
the point, their efforts are likely to be frustrated by the shade and play of meaning in 
the judgment, the half formulated second argument, the absence of the kind of precise 
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comparison to measure up X’s actions with the actions of reasonable 
person Y, to find out whether X was reasonable under the circum-
stances.65 Comparison also makes its presence felt in our political 
sphere, where groups are demanding recognition between and within 
communities. Comparison is fundamental to our political lives, as it 
determines how we identify ourselves as belonging to certain groups 
and how we distinguish ourselves from other groups. Comparison is 
also important for legal, moral, and logical consistency. The law could 
not function without comparison; and yet, the legal world has not 
quite given comparison the attention it deserves. Despite the abun-
dance said about comparison and law, we have not yet begun ques-
tioning fully the stakes comparison has in these matters.
An attentive reader might be thinking that it is well and good to 
discern a relationship between comparison and the law, but, so what? 
Well, that is partially my point. Comparison itself is seldom seen as 
significant; more often we encounter it uncritically as a useful tool. 
Questioning comparison is not only an acknowledgement that com-
parison underpins our system, but also that it challenges the status 
quo: how we find moral consistency and how we “do” law. Questioning 
comparison is questioning that upon which the legal world turns. 
Despite the plethora of manifestations of comparison throughout the 
legal world, it is somewhat baffling how it has side-stepped serious 
attention. While mainstream jurisprudential writings do consider ju-
dicial reasoning meticulously, questions raised by the notion of com-
parison have not been explored. Little has been said about the role 
of comparison in law, what comparison is, or how it came to be so 
ubiquitous.
Given how central comparison is to law, this Article seeks to thor-
oughly examine the literature on legal comparisons. The Article seeks 
to explore comparison using the common law tradition: How does com-
parison work? Comparative law seems to be a fitting place to begin 
this investigation, as it is a dynamic discipline where comparison and 
law are most visibly present together, thus one would expect to find 
comparison addressed squarely. We begin by asking the comparative 
law tradition: what is comparison? Moving through the literature, the 
Article will bring insights from philosophy and anthropology to the 
conversation in order to better understand the notion of comparison. 
 65. Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 notre dame L. reV. 
1575–76, 1578 (1999) (“In the spectrum from purely descriptive to purely evaluative, 
“reasonable” seems to belong more toward the evaluative than the descriptive pole, not 
that there is no element of the descriptive in it. If I say that the care manufacturers 
took in manufacturing some article fell short of the care it would have been reasonable 
for them to take in the given setting, I am not describing the care they took or failed 
to take, I am evaluating the care they took. I am comparing what was done with what 
could have been done, and assessing whether a reasonable evaluation of the risks 
would have left an actor in that situation satisfied with the degree of care that was 
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There are undoubtedly constraints and limitations that arise in any 
review of the literature. We cannot possibly address every approach to 
comparison. There are multiple approaches even by the same author, 
as the author refines and develops his thoughts throughout his writ-
ings. This is not claiming to be an all-encompassing review of every-
thing ever written on comparison. The purpose of this review is to 
seek out what comparison is, to find how each approach discussed 
thinks about comparison, and what the thinking underlying each ap-
proach is.
II. wHat Is comparIson?
A. Functional Equivalence
Comparison requires a comparatist to bring things together into 
a kind of unity. If you are a functionalist, then you will see function 
as the common point, but how does this work? For the functionalist 
comparatist, what needs to be the same is that the laws selected be 
doing the same thing in each legal system under comparison, in other 
words that they be functionally equivalent. The presupposition at the 
center of the basic principle of functional equivalence is praesumptio 
similitudinis, which assumes that every social community shares 
similar problems and that each society solves these problems with 
similar results.66 For example, many societies were faced with the need 
to create human milk legislation after various technological advances 
enabled a greater separation between the female body and the milk 
product. One of the pivotal moments of disembodiment came about in 
the 1920s, with the invention of the electric breast pump, which paved 
the way for breast milk to become a standardized product.67 Mathilde 
Cohen examined the different approaches to human milk legislation in 
France and the United States. In France, human milk banking began 
in the early twentieth century and was based on the 1890s Goutte de 
lait movement that provided safe cow’s milk for babies. After World 
War II, human milk banks were seen as a public health issue and 
heavily regulated.68 The sale of human milk is still heavily regulated 
and can only be processed and distributed by lactariums; human milk 
is categorized as a bodily part, like an organ, and cannot be sold.69 
In contrast, in the United States, milk banks were organized by pri-
vate individuals and with limited state intervention; formula was a 
more popular alternative than milk banks.70 The United States have 
 66. See Konrad ZweIgert & HeIn KötZ, an IntroductIon to comparatIVe Law 34 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
 67. Mathilde Cohen, Regulating Milk: Women and Cows in France and the United 
States, 65 am. J. comp. L. 490 (2017).
 68. Id. at 490–92.
 69. Id. at 494.
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taken a more laissez-faire approach, leaving human milk exchanges 
unregulated. By omitting human milk from federal regulations sur-
rounding blood and other bodily tissues, the U.S. government impli-
citly views human milk as a food product, rather than a bodily part.71 
Cohen noted many similarities in the processing of human milk and 
animal milk despite the “different regulatory frameworks in place in 
the United States and in France, milk banking follows in the footsteps 
of animal milk when it comes to quality assurance.”72 These examples 
show how societies can be faced with similar problems—how to regu-
late human milk exchanges—and find different solutions based on 
their existing practices, laws, and cultures. So, the same substance 
can be categorized as a food and as a bodily part by different societies, 
but these societies come to similar results (processing the milk and 
safeguards) through the various frameworks employed.
The praesumptio similitudinis principle provides some certainty 
by guiding comparatists employing a functionalist approach to dis-
cover similarities between legal systems. A functionalist comparatist 
might provide an answer to the question, “what is comparison?,” by 
evoking the sameness of function between the different laws and sys-
tems under comparison. Functional equivalence is the pegs holding 
comparisons on the continuous washing line of the praesumptio 
similitudinis principle. Without these pegs, there would be nothing for 
the comparatist to grasp. If laws are not functionally equivalent, then 
they are incomparables, and thus cannot be usefully compared.73 The 
functionalist approach falls silent when it comes to describing exactly 
what the nature of incomparables is and what space they inhabit. 
Instead, it suggests that comparatists, who have found differences be-
tween systems, check again to see whether their research question 
was posed solely in functional terms.74 The functionalist approach, 
therefore, can accommodate some difference within the principle of 
functionality, that is, within its own sphere. Still, we might be left 
with a sense of dissatisfaction with this explanation of comparison. 
 71. In the 1980s HIV crisis, milk banks in the United States founded their own 
professional organization, the Human Milk Banking Association of North America 
(HMBANA); and after the U.S. government failed to regulate milk banks, they created 
their own voluntary guidelines. See id. at 496.
 72. Id. at 499.
 73. Functionalists claim that the basic methodological principle of all compara-
tive law is functionality: see ZweIgert & KötZ, supra note 66, at 34. Functionalism was 
seen as a twentieth-century scientific breakthrough in comparative law, allowing for 
a greater understanding of context by closely examining the function of legal rules. 
The narrower law-as-rules approach of the nineteenth-century, saw comparatists all 
too often find “no law” in foreign legal systems. See Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure 
Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HarV. Int’L L.J. 221, 228 (1999). 
See also Laura Nader, Law and the Theory of the Lack, 28 HastIngs Int’L & comp. 
L. reV. 191 (2005).
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Why is it that, in comparison, function should matter above all else? 
What makes function the queen of comparison, deciding what is 
comparable, whereas its very absence should determine the incom-
parability of objects? Can functionalism accommodate a radical 
difference outside the sphere of recognized functional sameness? 
What is function, and how is function related to the thing? These 
questions seem too obvious to warrant any further consideration. 
To begin to understand comparison we require a different approach, 
so taking the wise guidance of the functionalists we will cast our 
net wider.
B. Criss-Crossing and Intertwining Aspectival Games
We know that all things are said to have aspects, characteris-
tics, or properties, and vice-versa, that these aspects, characteristics, 
or properties belong to things. Just like hardness might be a prop-
erty making oak useful in construction, function seems somehow a 
part of a legal thing enabling comparisons to take place. Saying func-
tion is part of a thing and helpful for comparison is almost not worth 
saying. Still, if aspects belong to things and we are only comparing 
functionally equivalent things, then there must also be other aspects 
that also belong to things that are not included in the comparison—
Where do they go? What kind of relationship do aspects have with the 
things? Are the aspects inside the material thing or external to the 
thing? Even within one thing there are a variety of different proper-
ties being concealed and revealed: to point to a piece of paper’s shape 
and then to its color, is to point to an identical thing and mean some-
thing different.75 Where is the color? Where is the shape? Without the 
comparatist, would there be aspects? With these questions in mind, 
we may have to reform our view to account for the other aspects not 
shown in the comparison. The tertium comparationis binds together 
the aspects coming into focus in the comparison and the reasons for 
the comparison. It means the third element in comparison, that is the 
 75. Wittgenstein illustrates this point further:
Point at a piece of paper.—And now point at its shape-now at its colour—
now at its number (that sounds odd).—well, how did you do it?—you’ll say 
that you ‘meant’ something different each time you pointed. And if I ask how 
that is done, you’ll say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the 
shape, and so on. But now I ask again: how is that done? Suppose someone 
points to a vase and says “Look at the marvellous blue—forget about the 
shape.” Or: “Look at the marvellous shape—the colour doesn’t matter.” No 
doubt you’ll do something different in each case, when you do what he asks 
you. But do you always do the same thing when you direct your attention 
to the colour?
LudwIg wIttgensteIn, pHILosopHIcaL InVestIgatIons 16e para. 33 (G.E.M. Anscombe et al. 
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“factor which links or is the common ground between two elements in 
comparison.”76 There are usually multiple tertia comparationis. Where 
certain aspects of the things under comparison are not the focus of the 
comparison, these fade into the background and are concealed by the 
comparison.
Wittgenstein uses the word “game” to show how there are no 
common features in examples of games, but there are similarities or 
relationships among all games.77 Comparison seems to be a game of 
bringing to light different aspects of the things under comparison. 
Hence, some games, such as tennis, football, and hockey, share some 
features, such as a ball; others, like badminton and card games, do 
not. Tennis and badminton share a racket, whereas card games and 
football do not. “Look for example at board-games, with their multi-
farious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many 
correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop 
out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that 
is common is retained, but much is lost.”78 You may be thinking that 
legal things are not like football games, card games, or rugby games, 
but these games may help bring us a little closer to our question on 
comparison. Wittgenstein calls family resemblances the way in which 
similarities show themselves by cropping up and disappearing from 
view, when other aspects are brought to the foreground, as these are 
like resemblances among family members.79 Every comparison fo-
cuses on a certain aspect of the things under comparison, so the same 
things can be found to be the same, or different, depending on the 
aspects coming into focus.
Pointing to the properties and shape of the legal thing is slightly 
more difficult. Law is language. Wittgenstein likens language to an 
ancient city that has developed into a maze of different, overlapping, 
and interacting architectural styles and a network of interconnected 
streets and alleys: “Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach 
from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place 
from another side and no longer know your way about.”80 Language is 
 76. See Tertium Comparationis, in oxford engLIsH dIctIonary (oed) onLIne (Dec. 
2020), www.oed.com (with subscription). Tertia comparationis are a direct result of 
what matters to the comparatist. See Jansen Nils, Comparative Law and Comparative 
Knowledge, in tHe oxford HandBooK of comparatIVe Law 296, 299 (Mathias Reimann 
& Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2d ed. 2019). The tertium comparationis is the covering 
value (an aspect highlighted), which usually takes the form of x is “better than,” “as 
valuable as,” or “worse than” y with respect to V (the covering value). See rutH cHang, 
IncommensuraBILIty, IncomparaBILIty and practIcaL reason (1997).
 77. James tuLLy, strange muLtIpLIcIty constItutIonaLIsm In an age of dIVersIty 
107 (1995).
 78. wIttgensteIn, supra note 75, at 31e–32e para. 66.
 79. Wittgenstein’s family resemblances: “67. I can think of no better expression 
to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resem-
blances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, and tempera-
ment, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form 
a family.” Id. at 32e para. 67.
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far too close to us to be fully articulated in any account of it. We cannot 
understand because we lack a “clear view of the use of our words.”81 
We can see something familiar about comparison walking alongside 
Wittgenstein’s meandering and cobbled streets.
James Tully shows how the city-like view holds for the language 
of constitutionalism. The practices and uses of modern constitution-
alism share these maze-like features, which have evolved through 
use, and the various periods are woven into the constitution.82 Tully’s 
work demonstrates how the identity and meaning of any culture is 
aspectival, rather than essential, because no culture is identical to it-
self.83 Both similarities and differences crop up and diffuse, as com-
plex, crisscrossing and intertwined parts, come into view. Tully sets 
himself the following question: “Can a modern constitution recognise 
and accommodate cultural diversity?”84 The question seeks to find 
the spirit or approach that needs to be taken to properly respond 
to the demand for recognition, that is, the call for justice. The notion 
of the politics of cultural recognition was coined by Tully to describe 
the constitutional problem of cultural diversity. It describes peoples 
and cultures who have been excluded and are calling for recognition 
and self-rule on a culturally varied common ground within and be-
tween nations.
The politics of cultural recognition unfolds in the intercultural 
common ground, which is necessary to enable a conversation of mu-
tual recognition, even if it is laden with inequalities and misrecogni-
tion.85 When a demand for constitutional recognition is made, what 
follows is a squeezing of the demand into the language of contem-
porary constitutionalism—if it does not fit into the language, then it 
is not recognized as a demand at all.86 The language of contemporary 
constitutionalism is not neutral, it is only “one language among 
 81. Wittgenstein continues: “Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspi-
cuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists 
in ‘seeing connexions.’ Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate 
cases.” Id. at 49e para. 122.
 82. tuLLy, supra note 77, at 104–05.
 83. Id. at 11–14.
 84. Id. at 1. The question arises out of the multitude of groups asking for rec-
ognition, such as nationalist movements asking to be legitimately recognised as in-
dependent states, the recognition that law has been written by men for much of our 
history, women and ethnic minorities have been excluded, and this question also en-
compasses whether supranational associations can recognise cultural differences. Id. 
at 1–11, 14.
 85. Id. at 14.
 86. These new ways of representing the demand are then taken to be the grounds 
of their claim for recognition and tested in adjudication; so Aboriginal peoples need to 
speak about a “sovereignty,” or a “right to self-determination”—when these unfamiliar 
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others.”87 To truly hear the demands for recognition, we must learn to 
hearken and lend an ear to those who see things differently than we 
do. We must start with the right approach to allow for understanding 
to take place in a dialogue with others:
To understand a general term, and so know your way around 
its maze of uses, it is always necessary to enter into a dialogue 
with interlocutors from other regions of the city, to listen to 
their “further descriptions” and come to recognise the aspects 
of the phenomenon in question that they bring to light, aspects 
which go unnoticed from one’s own familiar set of examples. 
Since there is always more than one side to a case, one must 
always consult those on the other side. As a result of exchanges 
of views by denizens from various neighbourhoods and the 
findings of examples which mediate their differences, a grasp 
of the multiplicity of cases is gradually acquired.88
Tully engages with the sculpture of The Spirit of Haida Gwaii as an 
opening to think the strange multiplicity that shows a sense of belonging 
and celebrates diversity.89 The Spirit of Haida Gwaii is an opening to the 
demands for a constitutional dialogue of recognition. The artwork displays 
the diverse conversation, the features of cultural diversity that overlap, 
interact, negotiate, and reimagine. It tells the story of the voyageurs, how 
their identities have been shaped through overlapping interactions and 
interdependency, how they overlap and crisscross without losing their 
identities, and how their identities are contested and questioned through 
the intercultural, non-Haida travelers also present in the canoe.90
 87. Id. at 56–57 (“No matter how comprehensive such a language may appear 
to be, and some recent candidates in the philosophy of cross-cultural understanding 
have a very comprehensive appearance, it will always bring to light some aspects of 
the phenomenon it is employed to comprehend at the expense of disregarding others, 
as a result of the aspectival character of most social phenomena. It will not be a meta-
language of recognition and adjudication but, rather, one language among others.”).
 88. Id. at 110.
 89. Tully sees The Spirit of Haida Gwaii sculpture as a symbol of the age of 
cultural diversity. Id. at 17. The Spirit of Haida Gwaii was produced by Bill Reid, an 
artist, with a Haida Gwaii ancestry and it shows “sghaana (spirits or myth creatures) 
from Haida mythology.” Id. at 23−24 (“Approaching The Spirit of Haida Gwaii in the 
right spirit does not consist in recognising it as something already familiar to us and 
in terms drawn from our own traditions and forms of thought. This imperial attitude 
is to be abjured. Rather, recognition involves acknowledging it in its own terms and 
traditions, as it wants to be and as it speaks to us. No matter from which direction you 
approach the canoe, the crew members manifestly seem to say that, after centuries of 
suppression, they are here to stay, in their own cultural forms and ways.”).
 90. Id. at 24–25. Tully asks: “Is this not the constitutional game they are playing 
as they vie and squabble for position, both in the canoe and in Haida mythology?” See 
also id. at 204–205, 22–29 (“This Xuuya play is orchestrated by the endless juxtapos-
ition of these diverse and interrelated creatures, the identity of each consisting in the 
innumerable ways it relates to and interacts with the others. As the assemblage ways 
it relates to and interacts with the others. As the assemblage is viewed from one point 
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Cultural identity is contested and constantly reimagined, 
depending on which aspects are coming into view. Many comparatists 
recognize the co-presence of similarities and differences within legal 
cultures, legal traditions, and mixed families. David Nelken presents 
legal culture as contested and fragmented, consisting of sedimented 
historical memories, where any coherence, or unity, claimed by the 
comparatist is projected onto the culture by outsiders.91 Nelken’s ap-
proach acknowledges that one ought to be cautious when using the 
concept of culture, to avoid making other cultures seem either neces-
sarily similar or other. Similarly, the mixed legal families regard all 
systems to be mixed hybrids and constantly bleeding into one another 
and solidifying into new shapes.92 The legal traditions approach also 
views tradition as continuously fluid information without borders, but 
with a stable core.93 Traditions contain varying and conflicting views, 
while being in constant contact with one another and tolerating dif-
ferent views.94 There can be no pure identities or pure traditions, be-
cause difference implies isolation, and legal traditions are in constant 
contact with one another.95 One constant feature of comparison is that 
the comparatist must decide what to include and what to exclude.
C. Indeterminacy and Context
Questions have been asked of functionalism and mainstream 
comparisons in ever new and creative ways.96 Pragmatically, function-
alism has been found wanting for being too ambiguous to ground the 
comparison, unable to sufficiently distinguish between the intended 
 91. David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture, in comparatIVe 
Law 109, 114–20 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007).
 92. Esin Örücü, A General View of “Legal Families” and of “Mixing Systems,” in 
comparatIVe Law, supra note 91, at 169, 180.
 93. patrIcK gLenn, LegaL tradItIons of tHe worLd 13−14 (5th ed. 2014) [herein-
after gLenn, LegaL tradItIons of tHe worLd]; H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions 
Incommensurable?, 49 am. J. comp. L. 133, 140 (2001); H. Patrick Glenn, Doin’ the 
Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions, 50 mcgILL L.J. 863, 897 (2005).
 94. gLenn, LegaL tradItIons of tHe worLd, supra note 93, at 34−35 (“Given any 
form of contact between traditions, the overall identity of each becomes non-exclusive; 
each contains elements of the other, which may find support in the various tendencies 
in the receiving tradition. In today’s word there are therefore no pure identities of 
tradition. The language of contemporary social science recognizes this in objecting to 
‘essentialist’ conceptions of tradition, or even society. Identities thus become ‘contra-
puntal’ or ‘aspectival’; the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are realms which are interdependent 
rather than discrete.”).
 95. Id. at 35.
 96. Comparative lawyers have been described by some in the field (usually by crit-
ical comparatists) as falling into two broad camps: (i) the “mainstream,” or those who 
adopt a formalist, legal positivist notion of legal validity and strive for neutrality and 
objectivity; and (ii) “critical” comparatists. See günter franKenBerg, comparatIVe Law 
as crItIque 6–7 (2016). See also Simone Glanert & Pierre Legrand, Law, Comparatism, 
Epistemic Governance: There Is Critique and Critique, 18 german L.J. (2017). There are 
also many comparatists unhappy with the mainstream and for many different reasons. 
These debates within the field are important, but making the case for each is beyond 






/ajcl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ajcl/avab003/6245987 by guest on 26 April 2021
23THE QUESTION OF COMPARISON2021]
function of a legal rule and its actual consequences.97 The legal origins 
approach responded to the indeterminacy by using regression analysis 
to provide empirical data about the efficiency of legal rules.98 This re-
sponse created other difficulties in the field, and changed compara-
tive law from an exploration of similarities and differences between 
systems into a ranking of legal systems.99 The mainstream has long 
been a brutish tool, unwitting and unreflective about its situatedness 
within the broader political discourse.100 Ugo Mattei examined those 
sponsoring comparative law projects, the types of projects being 
funded, and the relationship of the work produced to the political 
agenda of containment, for example, the Ford Foundation funding 
various projects, including the Cornell project on the “common core 
of legal systems.”101 Mainstream comparative law propped up coloni-
alism with its myth of the “lack,” based on an Anglo-European-centric 
understanding of law. Laura Nader’s work on the “lack” examined the 
justifications for the Anglo-European colonial and imperial expansion 
project. The other lacked law, helpfully it was a “lack” which could be 
corrected by those inventing its (absence as) presence.102 The “lack” 
was created and grounded in a particular understanding of “law” and 
“civilized” people made by comparison. Owing to these roots the field 
 97. Christopher Whytock, Legal Origins, Functionalism and the Future of 
Comparative Law, Byu L. reV. 1879, 1889 (2009).
 98. By distinguishing between a legal rule’s intended function and its actual con-
sequences, we can tell if the legal rule has fulfilled its function: id. at 1890. The legal 
origins approach was developed by the economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez 
de Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert W. Vishny following a study they conducted 
in 1997 based on investor protection. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 
J. poL. econ. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins, 46 J. econ. LIterature 285 (2008); Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal 
Origins, 117 q.J. econ. 1193 (2002). The need for precision regarding what is measured 
and how it is measured can be traced back to one of the purposes of comparison, which 
is to find better law. Comparison can be used to borrow or transplant law from one 
legal system to another. This is rooted in the idea that we all face similar problems, and 
while we might solve them in different ways, one of these ways might be better than 
our current system, and we should apply that better solution. See ZweIgert & KötZ, 
supra note 66, at 1–62. This need for simplicity and certainty has created a new trend 
using numerical data as the basis for comparisons, and led to a corresponding push-
back against it. Ralf Michaels opens a dialogue between the legal origins approach 
and comparative law: see Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins 
Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 
am. J. comp. L. 765 (2009).
 99. Ugo Mattei, The Cold War and Comparative Law: A Reflection on the Politics 
of Intellectual Discipline, 65 am. J. comp. L. 567, 605–07 (2017).
 100. Note that there has been a debate for many years in comparative law circles 
about the reduction of the field merely to a method: see Geoffrey Samuel, Comparative 
Law and Its Methodology, in researcH metHods In Law 100, 100 (Dawn Watkins & 
Mandy Burton eds., 2013).
 101. Mattei, supra note 99, at 567–72, 578–79, 607.
 102. Nader showed how the “lack” provided a justification for the colonial appro-
priations of lands from the Native Americans, for the British Crown the land was va-
cant: Terra Nullius. See Nader, supra note 73, at 194. Nader’s argument demonstrates 
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wrestled with itself, the functionalist presumption of sameness was 
exposed for its suppression of difference.103 Many critical comparatists 
have pushed back against the mainstream, claiming it adopted an un-
reflective, Anglo-European, positivistic, and rules-based outlook.104 
Mainstream comparisons were grounded in a misplaced, narrow 
understanding of “progression” that displaced culture and cherished 
the calculative language of mathematics, economics, and efficiency.105 
Pierre Legrand’s stance against sameness, legal transplants, and the 
uniformization (standardization) of laws has been persistent and pol-
itical.106 It is tied to the cultural approach’s understanding of place as 
never static, rather, it is a dynamic constituent of legal meaning.107 
Understanding a legal culture is understanding the legal mentalité, 
which is the cognitive structure holding the culture, its underlying 
assumptions, and attitudes.108 To the question, “what is comparison?,” 
we may get an answer based on the suppression of difference and a 
shallow understanding of law, which fails to see the role of place as dy-
namic, constructing our understanding. But can the cultural approach 
account for sameness? Or are any claims to sameness in some way a 
misunderstanding and failing to hold true? Can a like-cases-treated-
alike principle ever be applied in the cultural approach, or would the 
 103. Pierre Legrand, The Return of the Repressed: Moving Comparative Studies 
Beyond Pleasure, 75 tuL. L. reV. 1033, 1048–49 (2000) [hereinafter Legrand, The 
Return of the Repressed] (“I claim that comparatists must resign themselves to the 
fact that law is a cultural phenomenon and that, therefore, differences across jurisdic-
tions can only ever be overcome imperfectly. Disclaiming any objectivity (and, there-
fore, bring to bear their own prejudices as situated observers), they must purposefully 
privilege the identification of differences across the laws they compare lest they fail to 
address singularity with authenticity.”); Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, 
in comparatIVe LegaL studIes: tradItIons and transItIons 240, 249, 288 (Pierre Legrand 
& Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
 104. See franKenBerg, supra note 96; Pierre Legrand, Jameses at Play: A Tractation 
on the Comparison of Laws, 65 am. J. comp. L. 1 (Supp. 2017).
 105. Legrand shows how economics is also embedded in culture and its language 
is a product of its culture. See Pierre Legrand, Econocentrism, 59 u. toronto L.J. 215, 
216–17 (2009).
 106. Legrand also critiques comparative law on the basis that it seeks to “pursue 
the ideal of impartiality by reducing differences in the lifeworld of the law to calcula-
tive and instrumental unity. . . .” Legrand, The Return of the Repressed, supra note 103, 
at 1033, 1050.
 107. “Place, then, is not a mere static backdrop to legal meaning: it is a dynamic 
constituent of it.” Legrand, supra note 105, at 215, 215.
 108. For Legrand, the mentalités of the common law and civil law differ: they do 
not converge, and convergence is undesirable. Legrand distinguishes between English 
legal mentalité and the civil law mentalité. Legrand notes differences in the approach 
to legal reasoning. English legal systems use inductive/analogical reasoning and em-
pirical/metaphorical notions such as “neighbor” and “life-in-being,” whereas civil law, 
with its Roman legacy, offers an intellectual scheme that classifies the law differently, 
transcending the raw facts of the case. Civil law reasoning is institutional. The role 
of custom differs between English legal mentalité and civil law mentalité; the past 
is always part of the present in the system of precedent, whereas Roman law was 
codified so we can always point to specific time. There are also many other ways the 
mentalités differ: the significance of systematization, the character of rules, the role of 
facts, the present of the past, etc. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not 
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inevitability of sameness happen at the expense of the recognition of 
difference? What would this mean for consistency?
D. Incommensurability and Truth
There are questions about the kinds of truth disclosed through com-
parison that still require attention. These questions come into focus when 
we consider incommensurability or incomparability. Joseph Raz uses “in-
commensurability” and “incomparability” interchangeably; however, he 
distinguishes these from “radical incomparability.” Radical incompar-
ability is where we cannot compare two options in any way; its cause is not 
a breakdown of comparability, rather it is as a result of indeterminacy.109 
Whereas incommensurability is where we cannot say neither that some 
options are better nor worse than any other, nor that they are equal.110 
Incommensurability arises where an individual has to choose between 
two options that are incommensurate and there is no reason for choosing 
one over the other.111 Incommensurability is significant because it is not 
another valuation of the relative merits and demerits of different aspects. 
The puzzle is that where options are incommensurate reason cannot pro-
vide us with an answer, oftentimes, in matters of great importance. Raz 
puts it poetically: “Incommensurability speaks not of what does escape 
reason but of what must elude it.”112 For Raz, only incommensurability 
holds truth because judgments do not say anything independent of our 
valuation; ranking aspects only determines a relative value, but it does 
not get to a deeper truth.113 Raz argues that a belief in incommensur-
ability is fundamental to having relations with others.114 Underscoring 
the importance of a belief in incommensurability as a prerequisite for 
having friendships, Raz shows how incommensurability is not the failure 
of comparability. Questions of comparability clearly raise further ques-
tions about the implications for practical reason. Can comparison be 
 109. JosepH raZ, tHe moraLIty of freedom 329 (1986).
 110. Id. at 324. Incommensurability is where “A and B are incommensurate if it is 
neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value.” Id. 
at 322.
 111. Id. at 334 (“To be precise there are reasons for (and against) each of the 
incommensurate options, and these may be enough to determine their ranking as 
against other options. But in the choice between the incommensurate options reasons 
is unable to provide any guidance.”) (Raz’s footnote 1).
 112. Id. at 334.
 113. Id. at 327 (“It is true of course that when we express a judgment about the 
value of options we strive to identify what is true independently of our valuation. But 
the ranking which determines the relative value of options is not a way of getting at 
some deeper truth, it constitutes the value of the options. Values may change, but such 
a change is not a discovery of a deeper truth. It is simply a change of value. Therefore, 
where there is incommensurability it is the ultimate truth. There is nothing further 
behind it, nor is it a sign of imperfection.”).
 114. Id. at 351. See also id. at 352 (“Certain judgments about the non-comparability 
of certain options and certain attitudes to the exchangeability of options are constitu-
tive of relations with friends, spouses, parents, etc. Only those who hold the view that 
friendship is neither better nor worse than money, but is simply not comparable to 
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situated outside the sphere of the comparatist’s willfulness or assertions 
of comparability? Does comparison seek truth as correctness? Does the 
judgment of sameness based on a comparison hold true in the same way 
as the fact that “the boiling point of water is 99.98°C” corresponds to 
reality? What causes incommensurability?115 What kind of truth does it 
hold? We will leave this questioning pending for now.
E. Slowing the Games of Comparison
The differing approaches to comparison are like different games, 
bringing out different family resemblances between the things under 
comparison. The functionalist comparatist shines a light on function, 
while at the same time concealing certain other aspects of the sys-
tems being compared. The teleological approach highlights and clari-
fies the goals the society pursues.116 The defense and prosecution both 
have in mind a goal for their comparisons, whether it is emphasizing 
an English precedent or reaching out to another jurisdiction to sup-
port their argument. A comparatist working on a unifying project is 
more likely to emphasize sameness; whereas a comparatist who main-
tains that legal cultures are incommensurable would see no signifi-
cant similarities between the legal systems under comparison because 
we are all rooted in place.117 Wittgenstein’s games show us that the 
 115. If we accept that incommensurability is where reason runs out, where we are 
stumped, and that a belief in incommensurability is a requirement for being able to 
form bonds—Where does it come from? Is incommensurability simply a judgment, or 
something prior?
 116. James Gordley, Comparison, Law and Culture: A Response to Pierre Legrand, 
65 am. J. comp. L. 142 (2017). James Gordley uses James Whitman’s work on privacy to 
demonstrate how the teleological approach works: see James Gordley, Comparison, Law 
and Culture: A Response to Pierre Legrand, 65 am. J. comp. L. 133, 142 (Supp. 2017) (“The 
object of Whitman’s study of privacy is to clarify the goals that European and American so-
cieties are pursuing. If the members of these societies were fully aware of them, they would 
need no clarification, and Whitman would be pointing out the obvious. By clarifying them, 
Whitman’s study enables members of these societies themselves to understand their goals 
better. By better understanding their goals, they should be better able to achieve them. 
Consequently, the teleological approach not only describes these goals but also enables an 
internal critique of how a society pursues them. One can ask, for example, whether a law 
or judicial decision actually contributes to achieving these goals.”); James Whitman, The 
Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 yaLe L.J. 1151 (2004).
 117. It is the appreciation of place as forming understanding which leads the cul-
tural approach to argue there is no common ground between legal systems because 
we cannot overcome estrangement of spatial dislocation. Place is never static, but in-
stead it constructs legal meaning. Place is that out of which law emerges. See Legrand, 
supra note 105, at 215–16. How place constructs our understanding is overlooked by 
the functionalist mantra, where place is implicitly viewed as inconsequential; hence, 
functionalists argue they can strip back the law to see it simply as satisfying a par-
ticular need. It is for this reason that this cultural approach sees legal transplants as 
embracing a shallow, formalistic understanding of law, which reduces the legal to rules. 
See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 maastrIcHt J. eur. 
& comp. L. 111 (1997). These views are consistent with understanding meaning as 
place based; thus one necessarily understands things differently than a native lawyer 
does, and a “meaningful” legal transplant cannot occur, for you cannot translate a law 
without changing its meaning: id.; Gary Watt, Comparison as Deep Appreciation, in 
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way to understand something is not to look for implicit rules, such as 
the necessary conditions for an entity to fall under the umbrella of 
a “game”; instead, we should proceed through practice, and muddle 
through various instances and examples of games until we come to an 
understanding.118
We can only catch up with the unasked question in comparison 
if we slow down further and reflect on what has been said. What is 
comparison? It is an aspectival game, whereby certain similarities 
between things crop up or disappear, depending on which aspects 
are highlighted in the comparison. Is that our answer? Bringing out 
this aspectival relationship is an important insight revealing some-
thing about comparison. But the aspectival game raises more ques-
tions about comparison than it answers. For one, what is an aspect? 
How many honeycombed aspects make up a thing? Are aspects in-
finitely divisible? Will there forever be another aspect escaping our 
account?119 What is the precise nature of the relationship between the 
thing and its properties? What is a thing? What is the relationship be-
tween comparison and the various things comparison has been linked 
with, be it function, efficiency, or free-flowing information? How is 
function linked to the legal thing? Where does function reside, inside 
the thing or outside it? How, when, and why did function or efficiency 
become linked to comparison? Comparison involves: (i) a drawing out 
of certain properties of the things under comparison; (ii) a joining of 
these properties back onto each of the things; and (iii) a judgment 
of some kind linking properties and things to each other. Thus, com-
parison cannot be wholly dependent on the perceived things. The com-
paratist is drawing out aspects and making a judgment—a judgment 
grounded in correctness, and somehow in agreement with the per-
ceived. Precisely how the aspects are linked to the perceived, or what 
truth they hold, remains unclear. Are aspects there in the thingliness 
of the thing? Or do the aspects make up the perceivedness of the per-
ceived (thing)? How does the perceivedness of the thing belong to the 
thing? Or does the perceivedness belong to the comparatist? If we pull 
at this aspectival thread a little more, we may find further food for 
thought.
 118. Summarizing Tully on Wittgenstein. See tuLLy, supra note 77, at 108. We 
understand something not by learning how a word operates in theory, but through 
the practical activity of using the word in different circumstances. See also id. at 106. 
I will be expanding on this point in Part III.A (“Seeing as, Aspect Dawning, and Aspect 
Blindness”).
 119. Marilyn Strathern calls this problem the perception of increasable complica-
tion: there are always more things for the comparatist to know. Any account produced 
will only ever be incomplete. We can only ever partially describe individuals/classes/
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III. asKIng tHe questIon of comparIson afresH
A. Seeing as, Aspect Dawning, and Aspect Blindness
Wittgenstein’s notions of seeing as and aspect blindness may fur-
ther facilitate our investigation into comparison. Wittgenstein named 
two kinds of seeing: (a) to see a drawing, the cat, or an entity in the 
world, (b) seeing as, meaning to see a likeness, or notice similarities 
or differences between things—noticing aspects.120 Wittgenstein used 
Jastrow’s duck/rabbit picture to illustrate continuous aspect percep-
tion (seeing as) and aspect dawning.121 Stephen Mulhall exposed the 
fundamental role seeing as plays as an attitude of taking for granted, 
it is a certain kind of knowing one’s way around, or in this case, the 
picture world. Mulhall showed how seeing as is essential to under-
standing an entity as a particular kind of object understanding and its 
relationship to a whole world.122 Thinking back to Cézanne’s paintings 
of his beloved Montagne Sainte-Victoire: a compatriot may examine 
these paintings and feel at home in the landscape; another viewer 
may notice the presence of the mountain in Cézanne’s works; an art 
critic may recognize Cézanne’s hand and perhaps situate his works 
as post-impressionist. In each of these examples, seeing as is at work, 
and in each case, there is an understanding of how to relate to the 
painting, the kind of object that is being examined, and a knowing of 
one’s way around the world of painting. To put it another way, seeing 
as is the moment before the Heideggerian hammer breaks, where it is 
ready-to-hand and fades into its usefulness. The distinction between 
seeing as and interpretation is also important. There is an immediacy, 
a ready-to-handedness to seeing as.123 Whereas interpreting some-
thing is distancing, an afterwards; interpretation is required when 
understanding breaks down.124 For the most part, we take our under-
standing of everyday things for granted; we already know how to use 
 120. See wIttgensteIn, supra note 75, at 193e para. xi (“Two uses of the word ‘see.’ 
The one: ‘What do you see there?’—‘I see this’ (and then a description, a drawing, a 
copy). The other: ‘I see a likeness between these two faces’—let the man I tell this to be 
seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself. The importance of this is the difference of cat-
egory between the two ‘objects’ of sight. The one man might make an accurate drawing 
of the two faces, and the other notice in the drawing the likeness which the former did 
not see. I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see 
that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an 
aspects.’”).
 121. Id. at 194e para. xi.
 122. stepHen muLHaLL, on BeIng In tHe worLd: wIttgensteIn and HeIdegger on 
seeIng aspects 24–25, 51, 142 (2014).
 123. Id. at 22.
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them, like a signpost would be ambiguous without the continuous 
practice of following it.125
Aspect dawning refers to that peculiar instant, whereby one is 
struck that the picture-rabbit is changing into a picture-duck. Nothing 
has changed, and yet it has changed, but nothing has changed. One 
can experience aspect dawning if one relates to the picture of con-
tinuous aspect perception.126 To put it another way, aspect dawning 
reveals the attitude of continuous aspect perception. Aspect dawning 
also begins to reveal how we have underestimated the role com-
parison plays in our daily life. Whenever there is a moment of aspect 
dawning, we see comparison most obviously at work. The moment of 
seeing differently, now in one way and now in another, is bound up 
with us somehow and hidden from us. Understanding is not visible 
to us and observing certain traits in things does not make it so.127 
For the most part, we are nescient of our daily comparisons. It is only 
where one way of seeing gives way to another that our eyes are opened 
to comparison. Wittgenstein’s continuous aspect perception shows us 
another way comparison is quietly present in our everyday life, and it 
raises important questions about our relationship to comparison.
If one gazed intensely at the famous duck-rabbit and only ever 
saw a picture-rabbit, then one would have misunderstood the object 
being observed, while remaining unaware of one’s own predicament. 
Not only would one be missing out on the joyful picture-duck experi-
ence, one would not be able to see that something was conditioning 
one’s seeing.128 Aspect blindness refers to this inability to experience 
aspect dawning. Wittgenstein’s examples show how aspect blindness 
might manifest itself as seeing a painting as a blueprint, or as specks 
of blue, yellow, and red paint; or seeing a human being’s behavior 
as individual processes of a machine, thus failing to relate to them 
fully as another quirky human.129 Mulhall clarifies aspect blindness, 
showing that is not on the same level as the aspects lacking; it is not 
 125. See Wittgenstein in g.p. BaKer & p.m.s. HacKer, wIttgensteIn ruLes, grammar 
and necessIty 136, § 2 (2000) (“It is not the interpretation which builds the bridge be-
tween the sign and what is signified//meant//. Only the practice does that.”). A sign-
post could be ambiguous without the practice (convention) of following it, we might 
not know whether to climb sign-posts, or follow the opposite direction to the pointed 
bit of the wood, our practice of using sign-posts guides us: see wIttgensteIn, supra 
note 75, at 39e para. 85. See also Tully and Patterson’s explanations of understanding 
and interpretation in Wittgenstein: James Tully, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: 
Understanding Practices of Critical Reflection, 17 poL. tHeory 172, 194 (1989); Dennis 
Patterson, Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation (Comments on the Work 
of Thomas Morawetz), 29 pHIL. InVestIgatIons 134 (2006).
 126. muLHaLL, supra note 122, at 30.
 127. “For even supposing I had found something that happened in all those cases 
of understanding, why should it be the understanding?” wIttgensteIn, supra note 75, 
at 60e para. 153.
 128. Oren Ben-Dor, The Gravity of Steering, the Grace of Gliding and Primordiality 
of Presencing Place: Reflections on Truthfulness, Worlding, Seeing, Saying and Showing 
in Practical Reasoning and Law, 26 Int’L J. semIotIcs L. 341, 363 (2012).
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an inability to draw correct conclusions, but rather the lack is found 
in the need to draw conclusions at all.130 Wittgenstein makes an im-
portant categorial distinction between aspects and properties: an as-
pect records the kind of object something is, whereas shape or color 
refers to the material properties of the object.131 The aspect blind infer 
through the interpretation of properties, rather than a ready-to-hand 
understanding of the painting, or a friendly face. This aspect-blind 
way of relating through an interpretation of properties could help us 
further in our investigation of mainstream comparison. At the heart of 
this matter is our earlier questioning, it is not clear what kind of rela-
tionship mainstream comparison has with all the things related to it, 
such as functional equivalence, legal culture, information—Are these 
what Wittgenstein called aspects or properties? What is an aspect?
B. Steering Togetherness
The problem of aspects and the classification of legal systems is 
the question of legal space; it is the placing of legal thought, that is, 
where legal thought takes place.132 The mainstream is full of boxes. 
There is a box for every thing: legal traditions, legal cultures, legal 
families, and even mixed legal families.133 Stramignoni diagnoses 
the problem of “boxing” as a kind of thinking that creates “boxes” 
(categories and concepts, territories, or corpora) which it treats as real 
and structurally true, all the while ignoring the uniqueness of the 
being they actually are.134 Boxing is an instance of a kind of thinking 
 130. Id. at 87.
 131. Id. at 28–29.
 132. Igor Stramignoni, Categories and Concepts: Mapping Maps in Western Legal 
Thought, 1 Int’L J.L. context 411, 419–423 (2005).
 133. There is an extensive literature dedicated to the indeterminacy of the con-
cepts and components of comparison. It interrogates various vague concepts, such as 
culture, to justify its usefulness in comparison. At times, culture includes both ideas 
and behavior; whereas the concept of tradition is seen as a clearer one, because it 
focuses only on information (ideas). See William Twining et al., A Fresh Start for 
Comparative Legal Studies? A Collective Review of Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions 
of the World, 2nd Edition, 1 J. comp. L. 100, 109–10 (2006). Legal traditions are some-
times seen as the dominant paradigm: see Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure 
of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 am. J. comp. L. 
671, 677 (2002). Legal traditions have a point of origination; then there is a capture (in 
memory or writing), followed by subsequent access and application; and lastly there 
is a recapture of information: see H. Patrick Glenn, A Concept of Legal Tradition, 34 
queen’s L.J. 427, 435 (2008). However, the idea that traditions can be captured is prob-
lematic. To capture traditions requires a cessation, which changes the nature of fluid, 
continually changing traditions. The mixed legal families also found a similar solution 
to this problem of indeterminacy; namely, by fixing the molten legal systems that cool 
down and solidify into new shapes: see Örücü, supra note 92, at 180. The solidification 
of the objects of comparison allows for the comparison to take place by allowing for a 
certain object to be grasped by the comparison. The talk of indeterminacy and ambi-
guity in comparison are symptoms of “boxing.” Boxing arises from the traditional sub-
ject–object thinking, and is itself caused by a certain comportment toward “things.”
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concerned with measuring out, a kind of instrumental and calculating 
thinking, which is prevalent in the mainstream and in the Western 
legal tradition.135 Calculating thinking dominates the meaning that 
is there, by deciding the approach in advance.136 There is a tension 
within the mainstream literature on comparison. The reflexive turn 
has brought new insights, such as the understanding that we cannot 
represent another culture, but only provide a connection with it. We 
now see that cultural identity is fleeting—evasive—in movement; and 
yet, there is still the drive to model nature in some way as being com-
posed of a multiplicity of entities.137 There is still a repetition of the 
same kind of thought driving comparison. The mainstream literature 
does not recognize the dominance of a kind of thinking that places the 
comparatist at the center because this kind of thought is so pervasive.
Mainstream comparison is still located within the subject–object 
framework, whereby it is the comparatist’s representations of beings 
that count, and we slide from one comparatist’s representations to an-
other in each comparison game. The comparatist steers comparability 
and (un)makes the meanings of things and places through the com-
parison.138 Mainstream comparison, its basic concepts and structures, 
require a human-centered steering by the comparatist. The kind of 
togetherness within mainstream comparison is the togetherness 
sought by the comparatist. The comparatist makes the belonging to-
gether through togetherness. It is the kind of belonging that thinks 
the togetherness first, as a knotting together by the subject.139 When 
we consider ourselves as human subjects “I” spying objects, we are 
making what Heidegger calls ontical inquiries. Ontic refers to a lan-
guage of descriptions and representations—beingness, rather than 
Being.140 Ontical inquiries are those examining entities and the facts 
about them, ontical is contrasted with ontological inquiry concerning 
Being.141 Mainstream comparison demarcates ontical inquiries, 
interpreting extants as an instance of functional equivalence, or an 
instance of information—the approach sets the inquiry. Mainstream 
 135. Igor Stramignoni, Meditating Comparisons, or the Question of Comparative 
Law, 4 san dIego Int’L L.J. 57, 57–65 (2003).
 136. Id. at 63.
 137. stratHern, supra note 119, at 7–15.
 138. See, for a description of steering, Ben-Dor, supra note 128, at 352, 366.
 139. martIn HeIdegger, Bremen and freIBurg Lectures 112 (Andrew Mitchell 
trans., Indiana Univ. Press 2012).
 140. Ben-Dor, supra note 128, at 348 (To this subject-object relationship with be-
ings, Heidegger called ontic, namely epistemological, theoretical, normative, logical, 
and derivative ontological reflections that involve representations of the “beingness 
of beings and their relations, crucially for our purposes, representations by and of re-
lations between human-beings. This he contrasted with the fundamental ontological 
question of Being itself (hence the capitalisation), which is the withdrawing move-
ment of presencing that persists alongside the beingness of beings (“ontology”), in 
complimentarity to it, but at the same time other and nearer than it.”).
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comparison does not think the ontological difference. Heidegger calls 
the difference between a being and Being—the ontological differ-
ence.142 The distinction between Being and a being is not simply an 
empty repetition. Being is always the Being of a being—it always has 
an ontical foundation.143 While Being is nearest to us, the ontic is the 
most accessible to us. We need the ontic “because” Being withdraws. 
Heidegger never stopped trying to ask the question of the meaning of 
Being. The question leads back to us, as those able to ask the question 
of the meaning of Being.
We are distinguishable from other beings because we live in 
the understanding of Being, and Being is an issue for us; we grow 
up and into a way of understanding ourselves.144 We are Dasein 
(Being-there), but Dasein is not simply a replacement for the word 
“human.”145 The Being of Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-
world is not a property Dasein has; rather, Dasein projects a world 
for itself—it ek-sists always already having stepped beyond itself.146 
Being-in-the-world shows how Dasein is not a self-contained subject 
encountering objects, because Dasein has always-already stepped out 
beyond itself. The usual subject–object relation tells us that we are 
directing ourselves toward what is perceived, and that the perceived 
is always understood as perceived in its perceivedness. The directing 
ourselves toward is usually considered as part of the subject, whereas 
Heidegger shows that this separation between the subject and object 
misunderstands how we are always already dwelling with extants.147 
Dasein is always already being-with intraworldly beings and under-
standing beings in their Being. As Heidegger puts it, “[f]or the Dasein 
there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an 
inside.”148 Heidegger shows how the perceivedness (uncoveredness) of 
the perceived is not within the extant, nor in a subject; it is part of 
Dasein’s intentional comportment toward extants, allowing us to ap-
prehend beings in their Being. But a being can only be uncovered if the 
Being of a being is already disclosed to us—I must already understand 
it.149 Dasein’s intentional comportment toward extants is grounded in 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.150
 142. martIn HeIdegger, tHe BasIc proBLems of pHenomenoLogy 319 (Albert 
Hofstadter trans., Indiana Univ. Press 1988).
 143. Id. at 19.
 144. HeIdegger, supra note 141, at 32–33 (“Dasein always understands itself in 
terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein 
has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them 
already.”).
 145. Id. at 67–71.
 146. HeIdegger, supra note 142, at 170.
 147. Id. at 64.
 148. Id. at 66.
 149. Id. at 70–72.
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The usual starting point of our investigations, whereby the com-
paratist selects from among the basic concepts of comparison and 
steers meaning, is an aspect-blind way of relating, or to put it in 
Heidegger’s language, present-at-hand. For the most part, in our daily 
lives, we use things in a ready-to-hand manner of proximity, without 
the need to measure where the coffee sits in relation to the keyboard. 
The keyboard does not usually draw our attention, becoming an ex-
tension of ourselves, until it stops working. The ready-to-hand is that 
which is nearest to us. The closeness in using equipment regulates 
itself circumspectively through using.151 Circumspection is the trans-
lation of “Umsight,” meaning a special kind of sight “um,” also meant 
in the sense of around or in order to.152 When the keyboard breaks or a 
key jams, then it becomes present-at-hand. There is much more to say 
about the question of Being and Heidegger’s early project, but what 
has been said should be sufficient to ground the question of whether 
there can be another kind of primordial comparison.
C. Poetic Comparisons
Stramignoni asks whether we can think afresh, What is compara-
tive law? This question is an attempt to overcome the language of 
description and representation in mainstream comparison. It is an im-
portant breakthrough that recognizes the terms of the debate, while 
attempting to move beyond it, into another kind of thinking. By asking, 
what is comparative law? Stramignoni raises the possibility of another 
way of comparing through meditating comparisons. Stramignoni em-
braces much of Heidegger’s thinking, bringing new insights to the 
literature. Heidegger’s later works reveal the difference between the 
calculative thinking, which we have encountered in mainstream com-
parison, and meditating thinking—original thinking.153 Meditating 
thinking is the thinking of Being through thinking language as in-be-
tween. Through it, we come to the thought that language is the house 
of Being.154 Unlike mainstream comparisons, meditating comparisons 
do not seek out sameness of function, efficiency, or linear history, but 
neither are they poetry, or any kind of representational thought of or-
dinary language.155
Meditating comparison is a kind of poetic thought. Poetry is a 
kind of dwelling, beyond metaphysical thought.156 For Stramignoni, a 
way to think the ontological difference in comparative law is through 
 151. HeIdegger, supra note 141, at 134–37; David Cerbone, Heidegger on Space 
and Spatiality, in tHe camBrIdge companIon to HeIdegger’s Being and Time 129, 132–33 
(Mark Wrathall ed., 2013).
 152. HeIdegger, supra note 141, at 98–99.
 153. Stramignoni, supra note 135, at 76; Stramignoni, supra note 15, at 753.
 154. Stramignoni, supra note 135, at 72.
 155. Id. at 63.
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poetic comparisons. The comparatist accesses meditating thinking 
through belonging to language. It is language that speaks through the 
law and not man.157 Law, like language, shares in-betweenness; law is 
both calculating thinking and other-thinking (meditating thinking). 
So poetic comparisons are able to show both law as law and the possi-
bility of other law.158
Language is itself a threshold, it is an “in-between”: it is both 
in thinking and between thinking law as law and other thinking.159 
Language is never fully present, but comes from a sheltered ab-
sence: “[T]he calling of language calls into a presence which can only 
be within an absence.”160 The comparatist poet is able to be aware 
of this co-presence: the present presence and present absence.161 The 
comparatist poets are keepers of this difference. Co-presence is also 
pointing to how cum-parare means to lay out together; that which is 
“laid out together comes to appear at the same time, it appears to-
gether, it co-appears . . . .”162 However, difference is not the traditional 
way we might understand difference. It is dif-ference, which sustains 
the world and beings in their Being, keeping them in their unity, to be 
what they turn out to be; dif-ference here is phusis, the emergence.163
Comparatist poets are guardians of the law: to be aware of a be-
longing together of a presence, where they are vigilant of the law’s 
presence and are aware of the absence.164 To guard means to watch 
with care, that is, to regard something or somebody meticulously on 
their own terms.165 It is through this vigilance and guarding that they 
are looking at something thoroughly, in their own terms—in their 
own radical belonging together.166 The comparatist poet is able to be 
a comparatist poet insofar as she is vigilant in the co-presence and 
a guardian of language.167 The comparatist poet can be closer to lan-
guage than most, because they are distant from home, and they dwell 
in the distance.168 In dwelling in the distance, the comparatist poet 
can tell, What difference does the law make?169
 157. Stramignoni, supra note 135, at 79.
 158. Id. at 71.
 159. Id. at 68.
 160. Id. at 69.
 161. Id. at 79.
 162. Stramignoni, supra note 15, at 769.
 163. Id. at 770. Heidegger called a dif-ference when language speaks the inex-
pressible, it is the delay between call and response, bringing thingness and the world 
together and apart in the in-betweenness. See oren Ben-dor, tHInKIng aBout Law In 
sILence wItH HeIdegger 68 (2007).
 164. The notion of belonging together is in the sense of belonging together, 
thinking our belonging together with Being. See Stramignoni, supra note 135, at 
74–78; HeIdegger, supra note 139, at 112.
 165. Stramignoni, supra note 135, at 78.
 166. Id. at 78.
 167. Id. at 79.
 168. Id. at 80.
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In many ways, Stramignoni recognizes the current terms of the 
debate and is pointing us further away from the legal tradition of cal-
culating thought. Poetic comparisons are not legal comparisons. They 
are an attempt to reinvent Western legal thinking apart from its cur-
rent form, solely in calculative thought.170 Poetic comparisons are in-
timations of a thinking that is still to come. They are a clearing, lying 
in-between. Our belonging to language means that we are able to ac-
cess both thinking law as law and other thinking, and that law (as 
language) contains the possibility of both.171 The way forward for the 
poetic comparatist is to continuously raise and ask again the question 
“what is comparative law?”172 This question about comparative law is 
asking about the ground for comparative law. It is a how rather than 
merely a what: “[H]ow can comparative law be thought afresh?”173 In 
asking how, it turns comparative law back onto itself, challenging it to 
think (again). This Article wishes to build on this work, and not only 
ask whether we can think comparative law afresh, but also whether 
we can think comparison afresh.
D. Not Yet Asking the Question of Comparison
The questioning of comparative law raises more originary ques-
tions about comparison itself. This Article is merely a starting point 
to show the reader that we are in comparison but not yet asking the 
question of comparison. Not yet asking the question of comparison 
does not mean that no one has ever thought about or questioned com-
parison. This Article has immersed itself in the labyrinth of ways in 
which different writers have thought comparison; and yet, while we 
are entangled in the questions of sameness and difference, of finding 
the function and tying together, we are still not asking the question 
of comparison. We are still not asking the question of comparison be-
cause comparison is seen as self-evident and unproblematic; but it 
does not follow that comparison is not worthy of questioning. This 
Article is shining a light on our ontic comparisons and asks about our 
relationship to comparison.
We cannot yet ask the question of comparison. Asking the ques-
tion of comparison would require another approach—a leap from 
our current thinking. Turning back to language may be a way of ap-
proaching our originary question of comparison. To think comparison 
etymologically is not to stumble into a decaying ruin and ponder what 
it once was; it is a way of letting language speak. We are bound to 
follow this way of thinking that comes towards us. The current litera-
ture is largely based on the Latin comparāre, meaning co-presence; but 
 170. Id. at 76.
 171. Id. at 71.
 172. Id. at 78.
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the word comparison has its origins in the Greek parable. The Greek–
English Lexicon defines the meaning of parable, παραβολή, as a com-
parison, illustration, analogy, and a proverb.174 Parable is composed 
of “para-” (παρα), meaning “side-by-side” and “-bole” (βολή), meaning 
“thrown.”175 The side-by-side of parable lives on, albeit distortedly, in 
the co-presence of comparison.
The relationship between parable and comparison has been con-
sistently confirmed by many sources.176 Parable has deep roots. In 
the Bible, it referred to the word of the Lord.177 Jesus also spoke in 
parables. When Jesus was asked by one of his disciples why he was 
speaking to the crowd in parables, he replied that parables were a 
means of access to the mysteries of heaven.178 Perhaps these revela-
tions have lost the force they once had, but they still invite us to think 
of the kind of truth that is disclosed by a parable. Speaking in par-
ables may be a way of bringing into the open a truth that cannot be ac-
cessed in any other way.179 In the Greek world, parables were a way of 
bearing a message. The relationship between hermeneutics and par-
ables is usually said to be about the “interpretation” of biblical texts; 
and yet, concealed within such a view is also a persisting primordial 
relation: Hermes was the god bearing messages and responding to the 
call.180 Each source sheds some light, and paradoxically adds to the 
intricacy. Hermes’ message may also be carried in poetry, and to some 
extent in analogies which all appear interrelated. These are merely 
initial thoughts that need to be investigated thoroughly. The initial 
exploration into the origin of comparison has laid bare the persever-
ance of parable, a placing side-by-side carried through the Latin com-
pare as a bringing together; at the same time, there was once a place 
claimed through parable—now lost. Comparison discloses much more 
than presently thought.
 174. 2(1) Henry stuart Jones & roderIcK mcKenZIe, a greeK–engLIsH LexIcon 
compILed By george LIddeL and roBert scott 1305,§ II (1925–1930). The ancient Greek 
etymology of παραβολή (parable), meaning “a placing side by side, comparison ana-
logy”; it also means a “proverb.” See Parable, n., in oxford engLIsH dIctIonary (oed) 
onLIne, supra note 76.
 175. The prefix “para-” (παρα-) means “by the side of,” “alongside of, by, past, be-
yond”; “para-” Bole is + βολή is casting, putting, a throw. See Metabole, n., in oxford 
engLIsH dIctIonary (oed) onLIne, supra note 76.
 176. One of the most authoritative and oldest English dictionaries describes “par-
able” as “a similitude; a ration under which something else is figured.” See aLexandre 
cHaLmes, samueL JoHnson’s dIctIonary of tHe engLIsH Language 521 (1994).
 177. Numbers 23:5–9; 23:7 (King James).
 178. Matthew 13:10–16 (King James). See also id. at 13:34–35 (“All these things 
spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables; and without a parable spake he not unto 
them: That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open 
my mouth in parables; I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foun-
dation of the world.”).
 179. “Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and 
hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.” Id. at 13:10–16.
 180. martIn HeIdegger, on tHe way to Language 29 (Peter Hertz trans., 
HarperCollins 1982); Oren Ben-Dor, Agonic Is Not Yet Demonic?, in Law and art: 
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